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COUNTY OF HUDSON; WARDEN HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL 
CENTER; HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY;  
GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY; GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK; DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY HUDSON COUNTY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-03563) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 26, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 







                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant Shawn Southerland, a New Jersey state prisoner, appeals the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants and denying his 
motion for summary judgment.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
exercise a plenary standard of review.  See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 
2000).  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
This case is now before us for the second time.  Southerland initiated the action in 
2010, filing a complaint raising numerous challenges to the conditions of his confinement 
in the Hudson County Correctional Center (HCCC).  In 2012, after Southerland had twice 
amended his complaint, the District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for failure 
to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).   
Southerland appealed, and we affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of each of 
Southerland’s claims, with one exception.  We ruled that the District Court had erred in 
dismissing Southerland’s claim that his confinement in the C-5-East segregation 
cellblock from June 11, 2010, to October 23, 2010, was unconstitutional.  Southerland v. 
Cnty. of Hudson, 523 F. App’x 919, 921-22 (3d Cir. 2013) (not precedential).  We 
concluded that, by alleging that he had been confined to his cell, which he shared with 
another inmate, for up to 23 hours a day for a four-month period, Southerland — who at 
the time was a pretrial detainee awaiting trial on first-degree murder charges — had 
stated a claim that his pretrial confinement constituted “punishment” in contravention of 
the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 921-22.  We thus remanded to the District Court for 
further consideration of this claim. 
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Before the District Court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the 
alternative, for summary judgment, arguing both that the conditions to which Southerland 
was subjected did not amount to punishment and that Southerland had failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies.  Southerland also moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that he was entitled to judgment on the merits.  The District Court construed the 
defendants’ motion as seeking summary judgment and granted judgment in their favor on 
the ground that Southerland had failed to exhaust his claim.  Southerland then filed a 
timely notice of appeal to this Court. 
We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  As the District Court 
emphasized, a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit “with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1983 of this title . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  Section 1997e mandates “proper exhaustion”; thus, a 
“procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” does not satisfy the 
mandatory exhaustion requirement.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006).  
“[T]he determination whether a prisoner has ‘properly’ exhausted a claim . . . is made by 
evaluating the prisoner’s compliance with the prison’s administrative regulations 
governing inmate grievances, and the waiver, if any, of such regulations by prison 
officials.”  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  Exhaustion under § 1997e 
is not subject to a “futility exception.”  Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Southerland objects to the District Court’s exhaustion ruling on two grounds.  
First, he argues that he filed a grievance, in accordance with the HCCC’s procedures, on 
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December 30, 2010.  However, the District Court rightly concluded that this grievance 
concerned a temporary lockdown caused by some unnamed inmate’s misbehavior, rather 
than the regular conditions in the C-5-East segregation cellblock.  Indeed, this lockdown 
occurred at the end of December 2010, while in this case, Southerland complains about 
the conditions from June 11, 2010, to October 23, 2010.  Thus, as the District Court held, 
this grievance did not give the HCCC “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with 
respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court,” Woodford, 
548 U.S. at 89, and does not serve to exhaust Southerland’s claim.1 
Second, Southerland argues that he wrote a letter to the New Jersey Office of the 
Corrections Ombudsman on August 8, 2010, that expressly complained about his 
restrictive confinement during the relevant period.  However, the HCCC’s grievance 
procedure requires a grievance to be submitted to the prison’s ombudsman, who logs the 
grievance and then forwards it to the appropriate unit manager for disposition.  Thus, 
Southerland submitted this grievance to the wrong office, and “[t]o exhaust remedies, a 
prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s 
administrative rules require.”  Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).  
                                              
1 On appeal, Southerland argues that HCCC’s unit manager failed to respond to this 
grievance, and that this failure to respond rendered the grievance procedure unavailable.  
However, Southerland did not raise this argument before the District Court, and we will 
not address it for the first time on appeal.  See, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 
606 F.3d 59, 73 (3d Cir. 2010).  Moreover, we note that, under HCCC’s grievance 
procedure, if the unit manager did not respond to his grievance within five days, the onus 
was on Southerland to request a meeting with the unit manager.   
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Thus, we likewise agree with the District Court that Southerland did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies through this letter.  See Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 
273 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that inmate did not exhaust remedies by sending letters 
“to individuals outside of prison administration”); see also Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 
445 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner failed to exhaust claim when he sent 
grievance to the improper person).2   
 Because Southerland failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the District 
Court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying 
Southerland’s cross-motion.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  We will thus affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
2 While it appears that the New Jersey Office of the Corrections Ombudsman forwarded 
Southerland’s letter to the HCCC’s director, this does not help Southerland here.  First, 
HCCC’s director was not the correct grievance recipient; as noted above, the grievance 
was required to be directed first to the ombudsman and unit manager.  Thus, even after 
being forwarded, the complaint was not filed “in the place . . . the prison’s administrative 
rules require.”  Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025.  Moreover, the undisputed evidence reveals that 
the HCCC never logged the letter as a grievance or considered it on its merits.  Therefore, 
this is not a case where the HCCC can be said to have waived compliance with its 
procedures.  Cf. Camp, 219 F.3d at 281 (concluding that exhaustion requirement was 
satisfied when, although grievance was sent to the wrong office, the ultimate 
administrative authority fully examined the grievance on the merits).   
